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Demographics and the Global Office
Market—Consequences for
Property Portfolios
Executive Summary, This study examines the effects of
demographic changes on the global office markets.
Growth in the labor force, the ultimate driver of office
demand, is slowing down in some countries and is con-
tracting in others. Eased on demographic forecasts, ex-
pectations are formulated about the future shape of the
office markets. The results suggest that office supply gen-
erally reacts accurately to changes in demand, but that
this will be much harder if demand contracts harder
than the write-off rate for offices. If office developers fail
to incorporate these ongoing demographic shifts ade-
quately, office portfolios might soon be confronted with
structurally high vacancies, decreasing rents and falling
values.
'Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
or dbrounen@fbk.eurnl.
"Maastricht University, Maastricht. The Netherlands or
p.eichholtz@berfin.unimaas.nl.
by Dirk Brounen*
Piet Eichholtz**
Introduction
In the last five decades, office markets have gen-
erally been characterized as growth markets: the
population of working age has been steadily rising
since World War II, and office employment has in-
creased in a cyclical pattern around the path laid
out by this growth. However, it is likely that this
happy situation is a thing of the past, and that the
future for the office market will be fundamentally
different. The demographic numbers presented
here suggest that the office markets are changing
from growth markets into replacement markets.
Easterlin (1966) was among the first and few to
notice the importance of demographic trends and
changes when modeling economic fluctuations. Be-
fore dismissing the long swings as a statistical il-
lusion, he advised model-builders to check the ef-
ficacy of their arsenal for the explanation of the
observed waves of population growth, which, ex
post, have been widely recognized as relevant to
economic experience. The demographic conse-
quences for property markets have only been in-
vestigated for housing. For the United States hous-
ing market, the (1989) article by Mankiw and Weil
has triggered a lively but rather short debate of
the potential effects of demographic changes.
Based on a simple model of the relationship be-
tween housing demand and house prices, the au-
thors predicted real house prices to fall substan-
tially due to the end of the bahy boom. Their
conclusions were subsequently criticized hy a num-
ber of authors, and after that, the investigation of
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demographic changes in the context of real estate
markets has faded away.
Nevertheless, it is likely that demographics influ-
ence long-run trends in the demand for office
space, which would make them a major driving
force for the future of the office market. In the past,
the demand for office space has been directly
linked to employment in the service sector, since
by-and-large a job created meant a job occupied.
However, if the labor force will stop growing as a
result of demographic low tide, this one-to-one link
between employment growth and the need for new
workspace may soften in the future. Job creation
may then no longer lead to new demand for office
space. That may imply that the current oversupply
in many national office markets will not be solved
as rapidly as has been seen in the past. This fun-
damental change in office market conditions has
not yet received the research attention it deserves.
But the demographic changes are too fundamental
to ignore. In many countries, the population group
aged 18 to 65, the ultimate driver of office demand,
has stopped growing, and in some countries it is
already shrinking. It is difficult to argue that this
will not affect the office markets. This paper tries
to shed some light on the possible effects of these
changes.
In order to disentangle the different aspects of
these demographic developments, the paper is
structured as follows. It begins with an interna-
tional analysis of demographic trends, using data
and projections of the United Nations for ten coun-
tries: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the United King-
dom and the United States. The labor force of
these countries is analyzed to detect trends across
countries and through time.
The focus then turns to the office markets of the
sample. Historic demand and supply statistics for
office space in each country in the sample is ex-
amined. The unique sample of office data was sup-
plied by LaSalle Investment Management. By link-
ing these demand and supply statistics to the
changes in rents and values, the study examines
how office markets have behaved in the past. His-
toric variations in office markets are linked to dem-
ographic fiuctuations in order to grasp the impact
of the existing labor force forecasts. Based on these
results, the study examines the future of the office
markets in the sample. The paper ends with a dis-
cussion of the consequences of the findings for of-
fice portfolio management.
Global Demographic Developments
and Labor Force Implications
The data regarding demographics are from the
United Nations. The database entails annual his-
toric numbers from 1950 and predictions until
2050 of the labor force: the number of people aged
18 to 65. Exhibit 1 provides the size of this age
group for this 100-year period for Europe, North
America, the Ear East and the world as a whole.
The graph clearly shows that the expected growth
of the labor force depends on the continent one
looks at.
In Europe, this age group has stopped growing and
is about to decline. The amount of people aged 18
to 65 equaled approximately 463 million in 2000
and this number is expected to fall back to 343
million in 2050, but will not move very much be-
tween 2000 and 2015: the expected number of peo-
ple in that age group is 463 million in 2015. This
contrasts markedly with the situation for North
America and the Far East, where labor force
growth is expected to continue, albeit at a slower
pace than these regions have become used to. The
Asian labor force is expected to stop growing only
around 2050, and will grow from 2000 levels of
2,135 million people to approximately 3,200 mil-
lion in the steady state. For North America, a
steady state in the labor force is not foreseen by
current projections. The labor force is expected to
grow with 65 million individuals to 260 million be-
tween 2000 and 2050. Until 2015, expected growth
is 30 million.
This variation in demographic outlook does not
only hold between continents, but also within
them. To investigate these demographics further,
labor force data will be examined for a sample of
individual countries: Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Exhibit 2
reports historical labor force statistics and projec-
tions, again for the period 1950-2050. The exhibit
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Exhibit 1
International Labor Force Statistics and Projections: Ages 18-65
• World
• Asia
• North America
• Europe
195(1 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
The numbers have been indexed with 1950 as the base year In 1950, the global labor force equaled 1.379 billion persons of which
Europe housed 332 million. North America 104 million and Asia 744 million persons. Source: United Nations World Population
Prospects Database.
Exhibit 2
International Labor Force Statistics
Australia
Canada
France
Germany
Italy
Japan
Netherlands
Spain
U.K.
U.S.
Average
World
Size
'1,000'
2000
14.356
16.912
36,320
53,035
37,137
82,200
10,244
25,802
35.888
174,872
486,766
3.482,774
Percentage
Growth
1950-2000
133.6
174.3
41.3
23.8
30.7
84.3
74.2
53.4
14.1
83.1
60.4
152.6
Cumulative
Percentage Average Annual Growth
1 2000-2050 '50-'6C
21.5
15.9
-8.1
-27.9
-34.3
-35.6
-13.8
-41.1
-16.2
28.8
-4.4
53.4
1.5
1.0
0.3
0.7
0.8
2,0
0.9
0.8
-0 .0
0.8
1.4
1 '60-70
2.1
2.6
0.9
0.0
0.5
2.0
1.5
0.7
O.I
1.4
1.7
'7O-'8O '80-'90
1.9
3.9
0.9
0.3
0.4
1.0
1.4
I.I
0.5
1.8
2.2
Notes: Labor force is defined as the national population in the age group
historic statistics, while percentages for 2000-2050 are projections. Source:
1.8
1.6
0.9
0.9
0.8
0.8
1.2
1.2
0.4
I.I
2 3
'90-00
1.4
1.2
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.6
0.6
0.4
I.I
1.8
00-'10
1.1
1.4
0.5
-0 .2
-0 .4
-0 .5
0.3
0.0
0.2
1.1
1 7
' 'IO-'2O
0.4
O.I
-0.3
-0.3
-0.7
-0.9
-0.2
-0.5
-0.2
0.5
I.I
'20-'30
O.I
-0.4
-0.4
-1.2
-1 ,3
-0 .6
-0.7
-1.1
-0.9
O.I
0.7
3O-'4O
0.1
0.2
-0.4
-1.0
-1 .9
-1.3
-0.7
-1.8
-0.3
0.4
0.5
'4O-'5O
0.3
0.2
-0 .2
-0.5
0.0
-I.I
-O.I
- 1 . 8
-0 .4
0,4
0.3
of 18-65 years old. Percentages for the period 1950-2000 are
United Nations World Population Prospects Database.
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shows that expected labor force growth until 2050
is much lower than the historic average over the
decades since 1950. This holds for all the countries
in the sample. Total cumulative labor force grov^ t^h
for these countries was 60.4% in the five decades
until 2000, and is expected to be -4.4% until 2050.
These growth rates are much lower than those for
the world as a whole, which underlines the fact
that the sample consists of relatively mature coun-
tries, both economically and demographically.
That notwithstanding, the extent of the historic
and expected development of the labor force varies
considerably across the countries examined. The
U.S. seems to be the exception, with the labor force
expected to increase 28.8%' between 2000 and
2050. Compared to the historic cumulative growth
of 83*!i^  for the fifty years before 2000, this does not
seem like much, but it is the highest expected
growth rate of any country in the sample. To what
extent immigration drives this ongoing growth in
labor population is not known, but it is striking
that the only other countries where the labor force
is expected to expand from current levels are the
other countries in the sample where immigration
has traditionally been important: Australia and
Canada, with respective cumulative growth rates
of 21.5*?^  and 15.99f. But even for these countries,
this is a fundamentally different situation than
what they have experienced in the period since
1950.
In the sample, the country experiencing the most
far-reaching demographic reversal is Japan. Its
historic cumulative labor force growth of 84.39f is
the third highest in the sample, while its expected
labor force contraction is 35.6%, the strongest ex-
cept for Spain. With Italy and Germany, Japan is
already experiencing labor force contraction in
the current decade. Demographically speaking,
France, the Netherlands and the U.K, take a mid-
dle-position, with a more or less stable labor force
in the next decade, and an expected contraction
after that. However, that contraction is less severe
than it is for Spain, Italy, Germany and Japan.
The historic demographic trends described above
have been accompanied with structural changes in
female participation in the labor force, and in order
to judge the likely effects of the demographics,
some of these changes must he taken into account.
Exhibit 3 shows summary statistics obtained from
the International Labor Organization, which dis-
play the development of female participation for
the period 1950 to 2000. These numbers show that
the proportion of female employees has grown
strongly in all the countries in the sample, except
for Japan and Germany, where female labor par-
ticipation has been high historically. Growth has
been especially strong in countries where the par-
ticipation rate was low to begin with. As a result,
the cross-country harmonization in female labor
participation is now much stronger than it was in
1950. By 2000, the female participation rate was
46% in the U.S. and 45% in Canada, France and
the U.K., vi^ hich suggests that increased female la-
bor force participation has run most of its course
in these countries and will not provide an extra
stimulus for the demand for office space like it has
done in the past. This is all the more so since the
growth in female labor participation has been
slowing down in all countries in the sample during
the last decade. That even holds for Spain and It-
aly, which have a relatively low female participa-
tion rate and may therefore be partly compensated
for the demographic labor force contraction ex-
pected for these countries.
Of course not all of the labor force is working in
office buildings and therefore the end of labor force
growth will probably not affect the office sector
proportionally. Therefore a brief analysis is in-
cluded of the national labor force distribution
across the main economic sectors: agriculture, in-
dustry and services. Exhibit 4 shows the aggre-
gated number of people working in each of these
sectors for the sample for the period 1950 to 2000.'
These numbers indicate that employment growth
in the mature economies in the sample has mostly
been restricted to the services sector, especially
when the period since 1970 is examined. By com-
parison, the number of people employed in indus-
try in these countries has not increased very much
in the last three decades, while the number of
people employed in agriculture has strongly de-
creased. In other words, the growth of the labor
force, both resulting from demographic forces and
from increased female labor force participation,
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Exhibit 3
Female Labor Participation: 1950-2000
50%
40%
30%- ^
20%
10%
<>
1950 —1960 —1970 —1980 —1990 —2000
The exhibit provides working women as a percentage of total working people.
Exhibit 4
International Employment Distribution across Sectors: 1950-2000
# people (mini
300
250
1960 1970 1980 1990
•" Services ^~ Industrial Agriculture
2000
The exhibit provides the number of people working in the three main sectors for the sample countries.
Sources: International Labor Organization & OECD.
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has been absorbed by jobs created in the services
sector, and is therefore directly linked with in-
creased demand for office space. That also suggests
that an end to labor force growth will translate di-
rectly into the services sector, and will affect the
demand for office space more than the demand for
industrial space.
Overall, the labor force will stop growing and will
even shrink in absolute numbers in various west-
ern economies. Future growth in the services in-
dustry is therefore likely to suffer from this de-
cline. In some countries, this may partly be offset
by a further increase in female labor participation,
but in others, specifically France, Germany and Ja-
pan, the potential for this seems limited.
For the office property markets, the difference be-
tween an actual decline and a mere slowing of
growth in the labor force may be fundamental. If
a shrinking labor force implies decreasing demand
for space, than supply growth will have to become
negative in order to maintain current prices for of-
fice space. Due to the nature of real estate, it is
much more difficult for supply growth to be become
negative than merely to slow down. If the market
fails to adjust supply, vacancy rates are likely to
increase, thereby pressuring prices and rents. The
market will move from a growth to a replacement
market, and the effects of that will probably be no-
ticed first and strongest in lower-quality real es-
tate, since in replacement markets, low-quality
products are usually replaced by high-quality
products.
All this suggests that among mature economies,
the American demographic situation is the excep-
tion, rather than the rule, and that the possible
property market effects of labor force contraction
should be empirically investigated with an inter-
national outlook rather than an American
Modeling the Office Market
Research on office market dynamics is extensive
and has provided insight in the way economic de-
velopments infiuence these markets (see Wbeaton,
Exhibit 5
International Office Market and GDP Statistics: 1980-2000
Australia (Sydney)
Camda (Toronto)
France (Paris)
Japan (Tokyo)
Netherlands (Amsterdam)
Spain (Madrid)
U.K. (London)
U.S. (New York)
(Los Angeles)
(Chicago)
Real GDP-Growth
Mean (%)
2 92
2.29
2.03
2.03
1.80
3.23
2.42
2.26
2.26
2.26
Std. Dev. (%)
2.68
3.05
1.61
2.60
3.15
2.28
2.22
2.48
2.48
2.48
Office Market
Total Stoch
3.778
12,566
29.214
36,696
4,919
9,770
16.335
31.287
12.994
15,632
: Avg- New Space (%]
2.01
3.06
2.44
3.20
3.36
1.89
1.39
0.63
4.09
2.99
Avg Vacancy (%)
7.44
1 1.24
5.67
5.21
7.31
4.77
7.42
9.43
15 74
13.63
Avg. Real Rent Growth (%)
1.84
-4.15
2.22
-0.55
1.73
0.78
0.13
-0.31
-2.46
--I.99
Notes: Stock represents the total amount of completed office space in buildings mainly used for office purposes within a market that is capable
of occupation regardless of the type of ownership or type of building quality, as at the survey date (normally at the end of each quarter).
Stock includes both commercial and public sector offices, purpose-built offices, offices that have been structurally converted from other uses
and independent offices that ^re part of mixed-use development. It excludes, however, ancillary offices within property that is predominantly
used for non-office purposes (e.g. retail, distribution/warehousing or industrial uses).
Completions represent floorspace completed during the survey period (normally annually and projected forward by three years) within a
market. Completions include both new development and refurbished accommodation that has been substantially modernized. An office is
regarded as complete when the developer will undertake no further work until a tenant/occupier is secured. In the majority of instances this
means that ail mam services are completed and suspended ceilings and light fittings are installed. Some developments are considered to be
completed when they reach ' shell-and-core" condition where the accommodation is to be marketed in that state. Sources: Jones Lang LaSalle
and Datastream.
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1987, 1999; and Kling and McCue, 1987). In these
models, demand typically is a function of rents and
employment. In an equilibrium market, economic
growth will increase employment and thereby en-
hance the demand for office space, ceteris paribus.
Supply of office space tends to be modeled as a
function of development costs and future prices.
The typical 'time to build lag' causes the construc-
tion of new office space to change with a lag and
create discrepancies between supply and demand
in the shorter run, which may influence office rents
and prices in a cyclical way. Using vector autore-
gression, Kling and McCue show that the nominal
rate of interest has the strongest influence on office
construction. Through the cost of financing, a fall
in interest rates directly reduces construction costs
and increases anticipated output indirectly,
thereby serving as a leading indicator of office sup-
ply. This relationship between nominal interest
rates and office construction prevailed even in the
late 1980s at a time when vacancy rates were in-
creasing swiftly, and construction levels were still
rising due to a decline in interest rates. This em-
pirical evidence underlines the growing concern
that future events are insufficiently incorporated
in the planning of real estate construction. The ret-
rospective focus on nominal interest rates is not
likely to signal the demographic changes that are
about to shift future demand for office space.
Wheaton (1999) proposed a stock-flow model of the
office market, in which the demand for office space
is subject to exogenous economic shocks. In Whea-
ton's (1999) model, a long-run increase in the de-
mand for office space will proportionally increase
the stock of that space. This requires the same rate
of new construction, without the need for rents and
prices to change. However, the question holds
whether this model is realistic when demand con-
tracts. Like the other existing office market mod-
els, the Wheaton (1999) model does not incorpor-
ate demographic variables. Instead, demographic
changes are among the exogenous shocks that may
drive demand. Moreover, empirical evidence of
Kling and McCue (1987) suggests that this set of
theoretical relationships does not hold in times of
economic contraction. Real estate developers have
strong survival incentives to maintain their activ-
ities even in times of high vacancy rates. There-
fore, it is questionable as to whether the myopic
Exhibit 6
Stock-Flow Correlations
Demand Supply
AustraiJa
Rent
Employment growth
GDP growth
Canada
Rent
Empioyment growth
GDP growth
France
Rent
Empioyment growth
GDP growth
Japan
Rent
Employment growth
GDP growth
Netherlands
Rent
Empioyment growth
GDP growth
Spain
Rent
Employment growth
GDP growth
U.K.
Rent
Empioyment growth
GDP growth
US.
Rent
Employment growth
GDP growth
Overaii
Rent
Empioyment growth
GDP growth
^0,01
+ 0.37
+ 0.30
-0.03
+ 0.66
+ 0.30
+ 0.08
+ 0.57
+ 0.64
+ 0.10
+ 0.46
+ 0.57
+ 0.00
+0.35
+0.43
-O.M
+ 0,47
+ 0.34
+ 0.22
+ 0.40
+0.55
-O.M
+ 0.60
+ 0.27
-0.03
+ 0.49
+ 0.44
-0.25
+ 0.02
-0.03
+ 0.57
+ 0.57
+ 0.37
+ 0.02
+ 0.08
+ 0.14
+ 0.28
+ 0-49
+ 0.40
+ 0.19
+ 0.19
+ 0.16
40.55
+ 0.60
+ 0.38
+ 0.i2
+ 0.44
+ 0.21
+ 0.07
+ 0.44
+ 0.20
+ 0.20
+ 0.35
+ 0,25
Notes: Demand is defined as the annual absorption of office space,
while supply is measured as the annuai compieted square meters of
office space as a percentage of the existing stock during the year.
planning horizons of real estate developers will
support the conclusions of the stock-fiow model in
the current office markets.
Demographic Implications for the
Office Market
To explore the demographic effects in the office
markets, data supplied by LaSalle Investment
Management was employed. The data cover office
space, rents, vacancies, yields and new space and
Journal of Real Estate Portfolio Management 237
Dirk Brounen, Piet Elchholtz
Exhibit 7
International New Space and Service Employment Growth over Time
Japan
Idw ! • IIJJ
are on the MSA level for the following cities: Syd-
ney, Toronto, Paris, Tokyo, Amsterdam, Madrid,
London, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York. The
fact that the office market data are at another re-
gional level of disaggregation than the demo-
graphic data may influence the results, but there
is not much that can be done about this: interna-
tional office market data is not available on a na-
tional level, and demographic data not on a city
level.
Exhibit 5 provides office market statistics for the
cities in the sample, presenting information re-
garding the stock of office space, average office
completions and vacancy as a percentage of that
stock, and average rents, as well as GDP growth.
As one can see, the cross-sectional variation in
these variables is generally considerable, but that
does not hold for real GDP growth, which is
just above 2% per annum and rather consistent
across the countries in the sample. Spain (3.23%)
and Australia (2.92%) do a bit better, while the
Netherlands {L80%) does a bit worse than the
sample average. During the 1980-2000 period,
relative office completions have been highest in
Amsterdam, Tokyo and Toronto, while they have
been lowest in London with an average of just
1.39% of the office stock per year. There seems to
be a weakly positive relationship between growth
in the labor force, as presented in Exhibit 2, and
growth in office supply, as presented in Exhibit 5.
For the countries in the sample, there is a Spear-
man rank correlation between the two variables
of 0.19.
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Exhibit 7 (continued)
International New Space and Service Employment Growth over Time
I nllcil Kingdom
MM
I
k- liilllll
Source: Jones Lang LaSalle
With regards to vacancy, the U.S. and Canada lead
the pack, with average vacancies during the
sample period of more than 11%. Madrid, Tokyo
and Paris have experienced average vacancy rates
around 5%, not far removed from what would be
considered the natural vacancy rate in the U.S. Fi-
nally, real rent growth has also varied considerably
across the cities in the sample, showing a negative
relationship with the average vacancy rate: the
cross-country correlation between the two varia-
bles is -0.73. In Canada and the U.S., real rents
have fallen during the 1980—2000 period, and in
France and the Netherlands, where vacancy was
lower, real rent growth has been in line with real
GDP growth.
When confronting the office market numbers pre-
sented in Exhibit 5 with the labor force data
reported in Exhibit 2, one does not see a clear
relationship between them. For example, labor
force growth between 1980 and 2000 was lowest in
the US. and highest in Australia and Canada, but
cities in Canada and the U.S. share a pattern of
high vacancy and real rent contraction, while Syd-
ney has real rent growth and lower vacancy. It
looks as if the growth in new supply has played a
much bigger role: cities where supply has been
substantial have higher vacancy and lower rents.
The cross-country correlation between supply
growth and vacancy was 0.43 and between supply
growth and real rent growth -0.37.
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Exhibit 8
Contemporaneous and Lagged Correlations between Service Employment Growth
and Relative Office Space Completions
Contemporaneous
i -year lag
2-year lag
US,
0,43
0,39
0,44
Canada
0.16
0.49
0.58
Spain
-0.17
0.31
0.61
Notes: The correlation coefficients measure the relationship between
relative annual completions of office space, both contemporaneously
build lag.
Japan
0.49
0,55
0,43
NL Australia
0.19 -0,13
0.04 0,05
-0.13 0.03
U,K,
-0,08
0,21
0,44
AVG
0,13
0.29
0,34
the growth in service employment [annual number of jobs) and the
and with lagged employment growth in order to capture the time to
To investigate these relationships a bit deeper, a
correlation analysis was conducted on the inter-
national office series (see Exhibit 6). In line with
the stock-flow model, a positive relationship is
found between real GDP growth and employment
growth on the one hand and the demand for office
space, as measured by office absorption, on the
other. The numbers reported in Exhibit 6 do not
suggest a consistent relationship between real rent
growth and demand, which is not in line with in-
tuition. There is a mildly positive relationship be-
tween employment growth and GDP growth on the
one hand and supply of office space on the other
hand.
In Exhibit 7, the general labor force is narrowed
down to services employment sector and confronts
these with the completions in the international of-
fice markets. The graphs provide information re-
garding service employment and office completions
on an annual basis for 1980 to 2000. The graphs
suggest that there is indeed a positive relationship
between the two variables, but that it is not
contemporaneous.
Of course, given the time-to-build lag, a purely
contemporaneous analysis would not be expected.
Therefore, the analysis is conducted by studying
lagged correlations between service employment
growth and office completions, which are reported
in Exhibit 8. Generally, the correlations go up with
increasing lags. With the exception of the Nether-
lands and Australia, where the correlations are
around zero, the correlation between service em-
ployment and lagged office space completions is
around 0.50, and statistically significant. That sug-
gests that the office market generally reacts rather
efficiently to changes in demand, even if that re-
action is not immediate.
However, these relationships have all been inves-
tigated in a period in which the labor force in all
the countries in the sample has been growing. A
shrinking labor force will alter the picture funda-
mentally and it may be labor force growth and not
employment growth that will drive the demand for
office space. In countries where labor force growth
is merely slowing down or where it is only con-
tracting slightly, office supply may react to the
structural decrease in demand. Indeed, the corre-
lations presented in Exhibit 8 suggest considerable
elasticity, so it is likely that supply will slow down.
However, if the demand reduction outpaces the
rate at which offices are written ofT, price decreases
are probably inevitable. When using the labor force
forecasts of Exhibit 2 as a proxy for future office
demand, countries like Italy, Germany and Spain
are most likely to face this situation in the next
decades.^
Discussion and Consequences for
Portfolio Management
This paper has attempted to investigate the effects
of structural demographic changes on some of the
major office markets around the world. The find-
ings indicate a significant relationship between
lagged employment growth and the new supply of
office space. However, a shrinking labor force will
likely alter this relationship and it may be labor
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force growth and not employment grovirth that will
drive the demand for office space.
In that new demographic situation, either the sup-
ply of office space will have to adjust to the new
demand situation, or prices of office space will fall.
If demand growth would just slow down, Whea-
ton's office market model and the empirical anal-
ysis presented here suggest that supply would re-
act adequately, and rents and prices would not
have to fall. When demand actually falls, and falls
harder than offices are normally written off, that
will be much harder to accomplish: part of the
stock of office space will have to disappear, or he
converted into something else. This will take a lot
of time and will be very costly, and rents are likely
to fall before such an adjustment is completed.
Moreover, the question is not so much whether the
demographic effects investigated in this study
have negative consequences for the global office
markets, but more about who will have to carry the
burden. When the labor force contracts, supply re-
acting adequately is another phrase for builders
and developers going bankrupt, while supply re-
acting inadequately means investors performing
badly.
These consequences all indicate that portfolio
managers should be careful when investing in the
office market. On the whole, developers and inves-
tors with development activities will probably be
affected first and strongest by the change in the
demographic tide. Moreover, the findings suggest
that the speed and degree to which demographics
will cause lower demand for office space vary con-
siderably across countries. In most European coun-
tries, the labor force has stopped growing, and will
start shrinking in the next decade. In other coun-
tries, like Japan and Germany, the labor force is
already contracting. This contrasts markedly with
the situation in the U.S., Australia and Canada,
where labor force growth is expected to continue,
albeit at a somewhat slower pace than was com-
mon during previous decades. This also holds for
emerging markets, which may increase their long-
run attractiveness for office investors.
Several factors may alter these conclusions. First,
if companies in the service industry have struc-
tural problems in filling vacant jobs, they may look
for employees abroad. For traditional immigrant
nations like the U.S., Australia and Canada, this
is nothing new, but even in Europe, which has tra-
ditionally been more protective for its labor mar-
kets, steps towards more immigration are visible.
Bundeskanzler Schroder of Germany, for example,
has announced that his country is actively seeking
highly trained people for its software industry
abroad. The enlargement of the European Union
will probably stimulate this development, with net
migration from the new member states to make up
for the shrinking labor force in the existing mem-
ber countries. However, that will only mean that
the problem is exported to the countries from
which these people emigrate. The implications of
this are that Central and Eastern Europe could
well be less interesting for office investment than
is currently believed: even if income levels in these
countries will grow to Western European levels,
the working people for whom these offices are ul-
timately built could well have gone West.
Second, labor force contraction may be kept at bay
by structural changes in social security systems.
Broad discussions to raise the legal pension age
are already underway in the countries for which
the demographic situation is acute. Also, in coun-
tries with structurally high unemployment or a
sizeable part of the potential labor force disabled,
the shrinking labor force may provide stronger in-
centives to do something about it. For example,
maintaining disability insurance at current levels
will probably be unaffordable. This will likely
mean lower benefits, increasing the incentives for
people to leave the social security system and get
back to work. Nevertheless, the current pace of so-
cial security reform is such that it may take a long
time before these measures will have an effect on
the labor force.
Third, the amount of office space per worker may
shift upward in a structural way to absorb the
stock of office space when the labor force contracts.
Given the current trend for companies to decrease
the amount of space for employees, however, the
chances of this happening are slim and even if so
will not prevent office rents from falling. Indeed,
office space per worker will probably only increase
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in reaction to decreasing rents, but will not pre-
clude the decrease from happening.
Fourth, the demographic and employment statis-
tics used in this study are on the country level, but
it is very unlikely that the structural changes doc-
umented will be spread evenly across cities and
regions in these countries. Migration flows within
these countries may well distort the picture and it
is very likely that some regions will still be ahle to
attract people and will therefore buck the demo-
gi'aphic trend. In that regard, a look at history is
illuminating. Against a trend of a decreasing pop-
ulation for the country as a whole, the city of Am-
sterdam was able to maintain its population size
until the end of the eighteenth century through mi-
gration, while other Dutch cities had seen their
populations shrink and their economies decline
decades before. The housing rents in these cities
reflected this situation.'* However that will only
deepen the problems for the remaining cities. For
portfolio management, this means that it will be
even more important to pick the right regions than
in the past, as there will be more variance in the
fortune of the office market across regions and
cities.
Endnotes
1. The national numbers were abrogated into an international
indicator.
2. We acknowledge the internationalization trend in real estate
markets. Companies in the U.S. are likely to expand their
foreign activities as are European companies expanding
their U.S. activities. But since the vast majority of the Eur-
opean real estate markets are occupied by domestic firms.
the focus of this study is on investigating the relationship
between the economy and the office market on a national
level.
3. This conclusion is supported by recent research on demo-
graphics by Deutsche Bank Re.search, which formulates a
similar gloomy picture for the German office market for the
next twenty years.
4. See for historic demographic information regarding Amster-
dam, see De Vries and Van der Woude (1995).
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